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Abstract
This paper examines the informativeness of consumer information networks and their e¤ect
on price competition between rms. Under the proposed information mechanism, consumers
share their initial information with the members of their network and as such become better in-
formed. The main result of this paper shows how informative such networks are by characterizing
how many di¤erent pieces of information a network is likely to contain. This informativeness is
crucial for the degree of competition, as consumers comparing more prices induce rms to com-
pete more ercely. We nd that larger networks imply better information transmission, which
intensies competition and decreases all the percentiles of the price distribution. An increase in
the number of rms makes networks more informative, and decreases all the percentiles as well.
Our results are robust to the introduction of sequential search and network segregation, but an
increase in segregation decreases information transmission and increases all percentiles.
JEL Classication: D43; D83; D85; L13
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1 Introduction
Modern society is characterized by an abundance of marketplace information. The extent to which
consumers benet from this information availability depends on how well they are able nd infor-
mation that is valuable to them. They obtain this information through a variety of channels, but in
many types of situations they rely on personal contacts, or their social network.1 Such networks
might contain valuable information as individuals tend to di¤er in terms of the initial information
available to them. By creating and accessing an information network, consumers pool their initial
information and as such become better informed.
Often it is of importance how many pieces of information a consumer manages to acquire
through this information network. Consider for instance a consumer looking for the lowest price
for a particular product. The more prices such a consumer knows, the more prices he can compare
and the lower the price he will eventually pay. In such a situation the value of a network is clearly
determined by the number of di¤erent prices contained in the network, but exactly how informative
are they? This paper addresses this question by developing a simple, yet highly tractable, model of
consumer information networks. The informativeness of the network has important consequences
for the degree of competition between rms, as better informed consumers are more likely to buy
from the lowest-priced rm. We therefore explore these consequences for rm price-setting behavior
in the context of an oligopolistic market.
The basic framework considers a setting in which there are N potentially di¤erent objectsthat
consumers can become informed about. Each consumer is initially informed about one randomly
chosen object, but they can become more informed by accessing their information network. In
particular, we follow the model of interpersonal communication found in Ellison and Fudenberg
(1995) and Galeotti (2010), and assume that each consumer has access to the initial information
of k other consumers. By combining this information with the consumersown initial information
they can therefore become informed about up to k + 1 di¤erent objects.
The main result of this paper is a characterization of the informativeness of consumer networks.
In particular, we derive an explicit formula for the proportion of consumers that will be informed
about m of the N di¤erent objects. This formula turns out to be very straightforward and uses
Stirling numbers of the second kind, a series of numbers that is well-known in the eld of combi-
natorics. Given this characterization we then show how the informativeness varies in the network
1See Galeotti (2010) for a recent survey of empirical papers documenting this phenomenon.
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size k and the number of objects N . We derive the intuitive comparative static result that as the
network grows larger, or the number of objects increases, consumers will become better informed.
These intermediate results turn out to be crucial for analyzing the impact of an increase in k or N
on rmspricing behavior.
To investigate the impact of consumer networks on rm price setting behavior the model of
information is combined with the canonical oligopoly model of imperfect information introduced in
Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) and Lach and Moraga-González (2009, 2012). All consumers
are initially informed about the price of 1 of the N rms, but also have access to the prices known
by their network connections. We show that in the presence of consumer information networks,
prices tend to be dispersed. The reason is that some consumers will not learn any additional prices
through their network, whereas other consumers do. This discrepancy in consumer informedness
creates a tendency for rms to have periodic sales, as one the one hand they want to charge high
prices to extract rent from the uninformed consumers, but they also want to charge low prices to
attract the informed consumers. They balance these two incentives by randomizing over prices,
generating intertemporal price dispersion as an equilibrium phenomenon, as in Varian (1980).
Recent ICT-developments, such as the spectacular growth in mobile internet devices and social
media, tend to have increased consumer connectivity. Our model predicts that such an increase in
the network size improves information transmission among consumers and forces rms to compete
more ercely. This in turn reduces prices for all consumers by decreasing all percentiles of the price
distribution. A more connected world will thus tend to be a more competitive world. We also
consider the e¤ect of an increase in the number of rms on prices. It is well-known that in markets
with imperfect information, an increase in the number of rms can have surprising e¤ects. One of
the most striking ndings is that an increase in the number of rms might actually increase the
average price (see, e.g., Rosenthal, 1980; Varian, 1980), contradicting the predictions of standard
Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly models. We show that in the presence of consumer information
networks an increase in the number of rms always decreases all percentiles of the price distribution,
so consumers are always better o¤when there are more rms competing. The reasoning behind this
result is following: As the number of rms increases, consumers become more informed as their
connections are more likely to know a di¤erent price. This induces consumers to compare more
prices and rms to compete more ercely.
In a rst extension we introduce costly sequential search as in the seminal paper by Stahl (1989).
In particular, consumers can search sequentially for the prices they did not become informed about
2
through their network. We show that costly searchers choose not to search, and are only informed
by information pooling through their network. This generates a price dispersion equilibrium without
imposing ex ante heterogeneity in search cost as in Stahl (1989). Prices are shown to be lower in
the presence of consumer search, as rms have to charge prices that are su¢ ciently low to prevent
search activities. Unlike in the original model, an increase in the number of rms unambiguously
decreases prices. This is due to the fact that such an increase improves the informedness of all
consumers, whereas in the original model costly searchers did not become more informed. The
introduction of information networks therefore restores the prediction of standard oligopoly models
that competition tends to decrease prices.
In the benchmark model each of the k consumers can be informed about any of the N objects. In
reality agents have a tendency to associate themselves with others similar to themselves (see, e.g.,
Jackson and López-Pintado, 2013). In a second extension of the model we allow for such network
segregation and show that our main results continue to hold if networks are not too segregated.
In that case an increase in k or N still improves the information transmission, and continues to
decrease all percentiles of the price distribution. We also show that an increase in the degree of
network segregation tends to decrease information transmission and increase all percentiles.
This paper is related to several strands of economic literature. Firstly, it is related to the
literature on social and economic networks (see, e.g., Jackson, 2008) which studies the implications
of network structure on outcomes. Part of this literature studies how network structure matters
for the di¤usal of information, and identies conditions on the network structure such that
information spreads (see, e.g., Rogers and Rogers, 2003). The models used are typically dynamic to
capture explicitly the di¤usion of information, and the focus is on the convergence properties of the
information di¤usal process. This paper focuses on a more static framework in which information
di¤usal occurs immediately, and in which the network structure is very simple. These simplifying
assumptions allow us to highlight the informativeness of the network by being able to calculate
explicitly how many di¤erent objects the network contains. Another part of this literature focuses
on social learningand studies how networks can be used to aggregate information of individual
agents. In these models there is typically uncertainty about playerspayo¤s from di¤erent actions
but they can learn about them over time by listening to the experiences of other agents. The
network structure that we use is based on one such paper, Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), in which
agents hear about the experiences regarding two products from a sample of k other agents in the
context of repeated interaction. We consider a more static environment but generalize their setup
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to allow for more than two products.
Secondly, it is related to the literature on oligopoly under imperfect information.2 A large part
of this literature has explored the consequences on price-setting behavior of imposing a particular
information gathering mechanism, such as consumer search (Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl, 1989),
advertising (Butters, 1977) and information clearinghouses (Baye and Morgan, 2001). Recently
some papers have also started to explore networks as an information mechanism. For instance,
Lever (2011) and Nermuth, Pasini, Pin and Weidenholzer (2013) consider the implications of a net-
work between rms and consumers. The current paper considers a network of information between
consumers, as in Galeotti (2010), who studies the impact of such networks on consumer search be-
havior. Galeottis setup is however limited to a duopoly, which restricts the informativeness of the
network. The current paper considers an fully oligopolistic setup without consumer search. As such
we are able to highlight the informativeness of the network and its relation to market structure.
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following way. In section 2 we introduce the
benchmark model without search or network segregation. We characterize the informativeness of
the network and derive implications for rmspricing behavior. Section 3 covers two extensions of
the model: In a rst extension we allow consumers to search sequentially for prices they did not
learn through their network. In a second extension we allow the network to be segregated. We
also briey discuss two other extensions which are not covered explicitly. In the last section we
summarize our results and discuss directions for further research.
2 The Benchmark Model
2.1 Model Setup
The basic setup of the model is roughly identical to the model presented in Armstrong, Vickers and
Zhou (2009) and Lach and Moraga-González (2009, 2012). They consider a market in which the
supply side consists of N  2 identical rms who compete in prices to sell a homogeneous good.
Each rm faces a constant marginal cost c  0 and there are no xed costs.
The demand side is characterized by a unit mass of consumers with inelastic demand: Con-
sumers wish to purchase one unit of the good as long as the price does not exceed their valuation
v > 0. They purchase the good from the rm with the lowest price to their knowledge, but are
heterogeneous in the number of prices they are informed about: A fraction m  0 of consumers
2See Baye et al. (2006) for an excellent survey of this literature.
4
is informed about m prices, where m 2 f1; : : : ; Ng. The distribution of price information in the
market is then summarized by the vector  = f1; : : : ; Ng. The most important di¤erence between
the model in Lach and Moraga-González (2009, 2012) and the current paper lies in  : The authors
do not explicitly specify  and identify su¢ cient conditions on  under which competition decreases
prices for all consumers. The current model assumes an explicit information mechanism which is
inspired by the literature on word-of-mouth communication and social networks (see, e.g., Ellison
and Fudenberg, 1995; Galeotti, 2010).
The consumer information network mechanism takes on the following form: Consumers are
initially imperfectly informed and know only the price of one randomly chosen rm. As in Galeotti
(2010), they can become more informed through an information network: Each consumer has a
network of k other consumers, who share their initial price information with the consumer. Some
of these connections know the same price as the consumer, but others might know prices previously
unknown to the consumer, causing the latter to become more informed. Unlike in Galeottis paper,
we do not allow for consumers to gain additional information through search activities in the
benchmark model. This is because we want to focus explicitly on the properties of the network
information mechanism. In an extension we explore the consequences of the information network
when consumers search sequentially.
All consumers are assumed to have the same network size k, but some consumers will end up
knowing more prices than others as their network contained a larger variety of prices. In the best
case all of a consumers connections will know a di¤erent price, and the consumer will learn a great
deal from his network. In the worst case he might not learn any new prices at all, which happens if
all of his connections tell him the price he already knew. How likely each of these cases is to occur
is one of the main questions that this paper will provide an answer to. The network is also assumed
to be exogenous in size and costless to access. One rationale for these assumptions could be that
the network was formed for a more general purpose (e.g. social network), and not for gathering
price information per se.
Multiple interpretations can be given to the information network. First of all, it could be
thought of as an actual social network. If friends or colleagues are interested in similar products,
they are likely to have additional information relevant for the consumers purchase. This could for
instance be the case because the members of the network are geographically dispersed. Secondly,
it could be thought of as a type of passive search. For some products consumers do not actively
search, but they observe rmsprices during their day-to-day movements. A rms price will then
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only be observed by consumers that cross the rm on their path. The network parameter k can in
this case be seen as an intensity of movement: Consumers who move around a lot are more likely
to observe a rms price. One could also observe the purchases of his friends, who will tell what
they paid for the good.
The timing of the game is the following: First, all rms simultaneously and independently
set prices. After prices are set, each consumer observes the price of one randomly chosen rm.
Consumers then consult their network and purchase from the lowest price known to them. We look
for symmetric Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Information
As is well-known, a main determinant of the price distribution in imperfect information models
is the degree and composition of information that is available to consumers. As consumers are
typically considered to sample the rms in a random order, the consumersdegree of information
is summarized by the number of rms they sample. In this section we will therefore derive the
fraction of consumers that is informed about the prices of a certain number of rms.
As is standard in the literature, we assume that consumers are initially informed about the
price of one randomly chosen rm; the so-called initial price. This assumption guarantees that all
consumers are informed about at least one price and will always buy the product.3 Upon observing
the initial price, consumers access their network, through which they might learn additional prices.
This happens if the initial price of the members of the network is di¤erent from the consumers
initial price. Since each consumers initial price is random, the number of prices that will be known
by consumers after accessing their network is a random variable. All consumers have the same
network size k, so the probability that any consumer is informed about m di¤erent prices is also
the overall fraction of consumers that is informed about m prices. If we denote this fraction by
m (k;N), then the total amount of information in a market with N rms is summarized by the
information vector  (k;N) = f1 (k;N) ; : : : ; N (k;N)g. It turns out that the elements of this
information vector have a rather simple expression, which is summarized in Theorem 1.
3Alternatively, one could assume that consumers have no prior information and only acquire information through
the network. This is equivalent to reducing the network size by one, and hence does not change our results in any
signicant way.
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Theorem 1 In a market with N rms, the fraction of consumers with a network of size k that is
informed about the prices of m rms, denoted by m (k;N), is given by:
m (k;N) =
8<: N !Nk+1(N m)!S (k + 1;m) > 0 if m Mk0 if m > Mk (1)
where S (:; :) are Stirling numbers of the second kind and Mk = min fk + 1; Ng.4
Proof. By pooling his initial price quote with the price quotes obtained through the network, the
consumer obtains a set of k + 1 random price quotes. To be informed about m prices, this set of
price quotes should contain the prices of exactly m rms, where the identities of the rms do not
matter. Stirling numbers of the second kind S(a; b) are useful in this context as they count the
number of ways one can partition a set of a objects into b non-empty subsets. In the case at hand
the set of objects are the price quotes and the subsets are m specic rms. To give an example,
consider the case where the specic rms are rm 1 and 2 and the number of price quotes is 3.
Denote the i-th price quote by si and denote allocations of these price quotes to the rms as sets,
where the j-th subset contains the sample allocated to rm j. We then have that S (3; 2) = 3,
which counts the following allocations:
Firm 1 2
(i) ffs1g ; fs2; s3gg fp1; p2; p2g
(ii) ffs1; s2g ; fs3gg , fp1; p1; p2g
(iii) ffs1; s3g ; fs2gg fp1; p2; p1g
Stirling numbers only consider partitions, so the identities of the subset do not matter. In the
present context these identities do matter (as the j-th subset contains the price quotes of rm j).
We therefore multiply by N != (N  m)! to take into account all possible ways in which m rms
could be assigned to the subsets (when the order matters). The nal step is to recognize that there
4The Stirling numbers of the second kind are given by:
S (a; b) =
1
b!
bX
j=0
( 1)b j
 
b
j
!
ja
where
 
b
j

is the binomial coe¢ cient. These numbers are commonly used in combinatorics and represent the number
of ways to partition a set of a objects into b non-empty subsets. The author would like to thank Tom Potoms for
bringing these numbers to his attention.
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are Nk+1 possible sets of price quotes which the consumer could have obtained.
From these probabilities, two properties of the information vector are immediately clear: First
of all, a consumer with a network of size k can never know more than Mk = min fk + 1; Ng prices:
Clearly a consumer cannot know more prices than the number of potentially di¤erent prices, but
consumers are also bounded by the size of their network, as they cannot learn more new prices as
there are members in the network. This will have important implications for the equilibrium price
distribution, as rms can never face competition from more than Mk   1 other rms. Secondly,
any number of prices equal or below Mk will be known with strictly positive probability. For some
consumers rms therefore do not compete with other rms, whereas for others they facem Mk 1
competitors.
As Theorem 1 shows, calculating these probabilities require the use of Stirling numbers. A
table containing the rst few rows and columns can be found in the Appendix. For small m these
numbers are very tractable. For instance, we have that S (k + 1; 1) = 1 and S (k + 1; 2) = 2k   1.
Straightforward calculations now yield the following Corollary:
Corollary 2 The fraction of consumers observing one price is given by
1 (k;N) =
1
Nk
(2)
which is decreasing in N and k. The fraction of consumers observing two prices is given by
2 (k;N) =

2k   1
 (N   1)
Nk
(3)
which is decreasing (increasing) in N if k > 1 (k = 1) and decreasing (increasing) in k if N > 2
(N = 2).
The intuition behind the expression for 1 is clear: The only way a consumer does not learn
any new prices from his network, is if all of his network members know the same price as he did.
Since the initial prices are random, this occurs with probability N k. Note that when k  1 we
have that 0 < 1 < 1. In that case some consumers will not be comparing prices, a condition which
is necessary and su¢ cient for a price dispersion equilibrium to exist. If k = 0 then clearly all
consumers will only be informed about their initial price and we have that 1 = 1. The fraction of
consumers observing a single price is also decreasing in both N and k. Consumers with a larger
network, or consumers in markets with more rms will thus always be more likely to know more
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than one price.
The fraction of consumers observing two prices is also decreasing in the number of rms if the
network contains at least two members, and decreasing in the network size if there are at least
three rms in the market. Clearly if there are only two rms in the market, then a decrease in 1
must increase 2 (as probabilities have to sum up to one). With more than two rms, consumers
with a larger network are less likely to know only two prices, and more likely to know more than
two prices. This is intuitive since in that case there are more prices to be learnt. Similarly, if the
network contains only one connection, then consumers can never know more than two prices. An
increase in the number of rms will then only make it more likely that a consumer learns two
di¤erent prices. If the network size is larger than one, an increase in the number of rms will cause
the consumer to be more likely to learn a number of prices higher than two.
Another consequence of Theorem 1 is that the shape of the information vector can only take
on one of two forms:
Corollary 3 m (k;N) is single-peaked and is either:
(i) (weakly) increasing in m, (if k  k (N) or k  k (N))
(ii) rst increasing and then decreasing in m (if k (N) < k < k (N))
where k (N) < k (N) and both of these thresholds are (weakly) increasing in N .
Proof. see Appendix
When information networks are relatively small or relatively large compared to the number
of rms, then the probability of knowing m prices is (weakly) increasing in m. Only very little
consumers know only one price; most of them will know Mk prices. The logic behind this result is
the following: If the network is very small, the members of the network are very likely to all know
di¤erent prices, which makes it very likely that the consumer will learn k new prices. If on the
other hand the network is very large, it becomes very likely that all rmsprices are shared on the
network. In that case a consumer is very likely to be informed about all N prices. For information
networks of intermediate size, the probability mass will be centered around some central value of
m: Most consumers know an intermediate number of prices, and the share of consumers that know
either a very small or a very large number of prices is small.
An important nding is how the information vector changes as either the network or the number
of rms increases. The e¤ect of an increase in the number of rms on the information vector will
be important as it will be the driving force of competition. The e¤ect of an increase the network
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size shows how information ows in more socially connected markets. Both e¤ects are similar and
contained in the following Corollary:
Corollary 4 An increase in the number of rms N causes an upward shift in the information mass:
there exists an mN s.t. m (k;N) weakly decreases (increases, resp.) for all m smaller (greater,
resp.) than mN (k;N). This critical m

N (k;N) is furthermore weakly increasing in k and N . As
the number of rms increases without bound, all consumers eventually become informed about Mk
prices. The e¤ect of an increase in the network size k is similar to that of an increase in N . The
critical mk (k;N) is also weakly increasing in k and N .
Proof. see Appendix
As the network becomes larger or the number of rms increase, consumers will thus be more
(less) likely to be informed about a high (low) number of prices. The intuition for this result is
clear: If there is more to be learnt or there are more opportunities to learn, consumers will be
better informed. The result in Corollary 4 is stronger than rst-order stochastic dominance, so the
expected number of prices observed by a consumer must increase in k and N as well. The next
Corollary demonstrates this property by showing that this expectation has a convenient expression:
Corollary 5 The expected number of prices observed by a consumer with a network of size k is
given by:
Em (k;N) =
NP
m=1
m  m (k;N) = N
 
1 

1  1
N
k+1!
(4)
which is concave and increasing in N and k.
Proof. The expected value can be found rather easily by expressing it as a sum of indicator variables
and exploiting the linearity of the expectation operator. Dene Ii as the indicator variable which
takes on the value 1 if rm is price is known by a consumer (after consulting the network), and 0
otherwise. The number of di¤erent prices known by the consumer is now given by the sum
PN
i=1 Ii.
By linearity of the expectation operator we have that
Em (k;N; pI) = E
hPN
i=1 Ii
i
=
PN
i=1E [Ii] = NE [Ii] (5)
where the last equality follows from the fact that rms are symmetric. The expected value E [Ii] is
the probability that rm is price is drawn, and is the inverse of the probability that rm is price
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is not drawn. The probability that is price is not drawn is the probability that none of the k + 1
samples contains rm is price, which occurs with probability
pi =

1  1
N
k+1
The probability that rm is price is known is thus given by E [Ii] = 1   pi. Hence, the overall
expectation is given by N (1  pi).
Before we proceed to discuss the rm side, we provide some examples of information probabilities
to illustrate the main results of this section.
Table 1: Information probabilities
(a) For di¤erent values of k
k 1 2 3 4 5
3 0:008 0:224 0:576 0:192 0:000
6 0:000 0:016 0:231 0:538 0:215
9 0:000 0:001 0:057 0:419 0:522
1 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 1:000
(b) For di¤erent values of N
N 1 2 3 4 5
5 0:008 0:224 0:576 0:192 0:000
10 0:001 0:063 0:432 0:504 0:000
20 0:000 0:017 0:266 0:727 0:000
1 0:000 0:000 0:000 1:000 0:000
k=1 k=3 k=6
k=9
1 2 3 4 5
0 .2
0 .4
0 .6
0 .8
m
m
(a) For di¤erent values of k (N=5)
N=2 N=5 N=10 N=20
1 2 3 4 5
0 .2
0 .4
0 .6
0 .8
m
m
(b) For di¤erent values of N (k=3)
Figure 1: Information probabilities
Table 1 (a) and Figure 1 (a) list the information probabilities for various network sizes when
there are ve rms in the market. In such a market, consumers with three network connections will
never know all ve prices; they will most likely know two to four prices. As the network grows larger,
the probability mass is shifted towards higher numbers: Consumers with nine network connections
will know at least four out of ve prices with probability 0.95. As the network size becomes
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increasingly large, consumers will eventually know the prices of all ve rms with a probability
approaching one. Table 1 (b) and Figure 1 (b) list the information probabilities for various market
structures when consumers have a network with three connections. If there are more than 4 rms,
consumers will never know all prices as they are limited by the size of their network. When there
are ve rms in the market, most consumers will know the prices of three rms. As the number
of rms increases, the probability mass is again shifted towards higher numbers: In a market with
twenty rms, consumers will know at least three prices with probability 0.98, and know exactly
four prices with probability 0.73. As the number of rms becomes increasingly large, consumers
will eventually know the prices of four rms with a probability that is approaching one as they are
bounded by the network size.
2.3 Equilibrium Price Distribution and Comparative Statics
We now turn to rmsprice setting behavior, taken as given the level of consumer informedness
which we derived in the previous section. Throughout this section we will assume that the network
size is strictly positive (i.e. k  1), in which case we have by Corollary 2 that 1 2 (0; 1).
As is well-known, a pure-strategy price equilibrium does not exist if 1 2 (0; 1).5 In that case
rms both have an incentive to charge low prices to attract all price-comparing consumers (i.e. the
business stealing e¤ect) and an incentive to charge high prices to extract surplus from consumers
that do not compare prices (i.e. the surplus extraction e¤ect). Since rms cannot price discrimi-
nate, they balance these di¤erent incentives by randomizing over prices according to a cumulative
price distribution F (p). This distribution should be atomless since otherwise rms would have an
incentive to undercut each other at the atom. When all other rms randomize according to F (p),
rm is expected prots are given by
i (pi; F (p)) = (pi   c)
24MkX
m=1
m
m
N

(1  F (pi))m 1
35 (6)
where the arguments for m have been dropped for notational simplicity. When charging a price
pi, rm is expected demand of consumers who are informed about m prices, is given by the joint
probability that (a) such a consumer is informed about rm is price, m  (m=N), and (b) rm i is
the lowest price among all other prices known to this consumer, (1  F (pi))m 1. For the consumers
5 It is well-known that if 1 = 1 the Diamond paradox (Diamond, 1971) of monopoly pricing occurs (p = v),
whereas if 1 = 0 the Bertrand paradox of marginal cost pricing occurs (p = c).
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who only know one price (i.e. 1) the rm does not face any competition, and it will attract an
equal share of 1=N of these uninformed consumers regardless of its price.
In the case of unit demand, the upper bound of the price distribution F (p) should equal the
consumers reservation price v. No rm should ever charge a price above v, as no consumer would
be willing to buy at such a price. If the upper bound is below v, all rmsexpected prots could be
increased by raising the upper bound, which contradicts it being part of a Nash equilibrium. We
therefore have that
p = v (7)
This yields an expected prot of  (v; F (p)) = (v   c) (1=N), which is also the prot level every
other price of the mixed strategy should yield (as to make the rm indi¤erent). The equilibrium
price distribution can then be found by equating (6) to this common prot level:
F (p) solves i (pi; F (p)) =  (v; F (p)) (8)
As the prot function is a polynomial of order Mk   1, for which there is no general algebraic
solution (i.e. a solution in radicals), it is not possible to solve explicitly for the price distribution
F (p). By Descartesrules of sign, a unique positive solution F (p0) exists for each p0 and can be
calculated using numerical methods. Even though we cannot solve for F (p), we can easily nd the
inverse price distribution by solving for p:
p (x) = c+
v   c
MkP
m=1
m

m
1

xm 1
(9)
where x = 1  F (p). The lower bound is then found by setting x = 1, which yields
p = c+
v   c
MkP
m=1
m

m
1
 (10)
We are now ready to characterize the welfare consequences of an increase in k and N . We start
by showing how such an increase a¤ects the percentiles of the price distribution, as is summarized
in Proposition 6.
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Proposition 6 All percentiles of F (p) are decreasing in the number of rms N and the network
size k. As the number of rms or the network size grows larger pricing eventually becomes perfectly
competitive.
Proof. see Appendix
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Figure 2: Equilibrium price distribution (v=1, c=0.1)
By Corollary 2 and 4 we know that there will be an upward shift in the information mass, and
that the share of consumer not comparing prices strictly decreases. All rms therefore face a smaller
share of uninformed consumers, which is the source of their market power. One might be tempted
to think that such a decrease must induce rms to reduce all prices in the distribution, but this is
not necessarily the case. For instance, in a market with only three rms, a sharp decrease in 2
accompanying the decrease in 1 (so that 3 increases) can actually increase the upper percentiles
of the price distribution.6 Lach and Moraga-González (2009, 2012) point out that a su¢ cient
condition for all percentiles to decrease is that the ratio (m=1) should (weakly) increase. In that
case each share of consumers comparing at least two prices becomes relatively more important
compared to the non-comparing consumers. In the Appendix we show that an increase in k or N
raises this ratio. Both an increase in the number of rms and the network size thus decreases all
percentiles of the price distribution, including the lower bound (which is the lowest percentile).
Figure 2 (a) and (b) demonstrate this result by plotting F (p) for a number of values of k and
N . Higher values of k and N are associated with a cumulative price distribution that is shifted
6Consider for instance the following change: f1; 2; 3g : f0:3; 0:45; 0:25g ! f0:225; 0:225; 0:55g. In that case it is
easy to see from equation (9) that all percentiles above 0:793 actually increase.
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upwards (so the percentiles decrease). As k or N increases without bound, the price distribution
becomes degenerate and all mass will be centered around the marginal cost (i.e. a pure strategy
equilibrium).
Consumer welfare depends negatively on the expected price paid by a consumer. The next
Corollary shows how an increase in N or k a¤ects these expected prices.
Corollary 7 The expected price paid by consumers is decreasing in the number of rms N and the
network size k.
Proof. The expected price a consumer pays depends on the number of prices he is informed
about: A consumer who is informed about m rmsprices will pay the minimum of the m prices
he is informed about. The expected price paid by such a consumer is E(m)min [p] =
R 1
0 pdF
(m)
min , where
F
(m)
min = 1   (1  F (p))m is the distribution of the minimum price of m draws from F (p). Since
all percentiles are decreasing, E(m)min [p] is also decreasing in k and N . The expected price paid by a
consumer with a network of size k is a weighted average of the expected minimum prices E(m)min [p],
where the weights are determined by the probabilities of observing m prices. More specically, the
expected price paid by a consumer with a network of size k is Ek [p] =
PMk
m=1 m (k;N)  E(m)min [p].
Since E(m)min [p] is decreasing in N and k, and since an increase in N or k causes an upward shift in
the information mass (cf. Corollary 4), such an increase will also decrease Ek [p].
In line with the predictions of perfect information oligopoly models, we therefore have that
competition unambiguously decreases (increases, resp.) all consumers expected prices (utility,
resp.). With unit demand, prices are just transfers from consumers to rms. If all prices in the
distribution are decreasing then individual and aggregate rm prots must also be decreasing in k
and N .
3 Extensions
3.1 Sequential Search
In this section we apply our model of information networks to the sequential search oligopoly model
by Stahl (1989). In the original model consumers varied in terms of their initial information and
search costs, and could only become more informed by engaging in costly sequential search. We
incorporate information spillovers by allowing consumers to pool their initial information with the
members of their network before deciding whether they want to engage in costly search. The
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introduction of consumer information networks generates price dispersion as an equilibrium and
restores the standard prediction that an increase in the number of rms unambiguously decreases
prices.
In Stahls seminar paper on sequential search oligopoly, price dispersion was obtained as an equi-
librium phenomenon in a model in which both rms and sequentially searching consumers behaved
optimally. Firms nd it optimal to randomize over prices as there is heterogeneity in consumer
informedness. In that case randomization balances the business stealing and surplus extraction
e¤ects discussed earlier on. The heterogeneity in informedness is rationalized by introducing het-
erogeneity in search costs: A share of shoppershas a zero search cost and always nds it optimal
to compare all prices; the remaining share of non-shoppershas a positive search cost s and does
not nd it optimal to search as the expected price decrease from searching is too low compared to
the search cost.
An undesirable property of the Stahl model is the lack of information spillovers between con-
sumers and the associated informational unresponsiveness of non-shoppers to the number of rms
in the market. In equilibrium, non-shoppers are only informed about the price of a single rm and
shoppers are always fully informed, irrespective of the number of rms. This asymmetric infor-
mational e¤ect of competition has surprising e¤ects on prices: Stahl noted that for any downward
sloping demand curve an increase in the number of rms would eventually lead to monopolistic pric-
ing. Janssen, Pichler, and Weidenholzer (2009) show that for the case of unit demand the expected
price is strictly increasing in the number of rms. The driving force behind these strange results
is exactly the asymmetric informational e¤ect. As the number of rms increases, rms nd it more
di¢ cult to compete for the informed consumers as they are less likely to be the lowest-priced rm.
This induces them to shift their focus towards the non-comparing consumers and increase their
prices. By introducing information spillovers non-shoppers become more informed which prevents
rms from raising prices.
We incorporate information spillovers in the Stahl model by combining it with information
networks. In particular, we assume that prior to engaging in costly sequential search activities con-
sumers pool their initial information with the members of their network. If consumers are not fully
informed after accessing their network then they can still decide to search. Contrary to the original
model we do not introduce any heterogeneity in search costs among consumers. All consumers are
assumed to be of the non-shopper type and face a positive search cost s. In the original model this
heterogeneity was necessary in order for there to be heterogeneity in consumer informedness such
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that price dispersion could arise. In our model this heterogeneity will also manifest due to the fact
that some consumers will have more informative networks than others. As such we do not explicitly
need the somewhat articial construct of shoppersto generate price dispersion.
After accessing the network, the share of consumers that is informed about m prices is given
by the expression in Theorem 1. Consumers that do not become fully informed can now become
more informed by engaging in costly sequential search activities. It is well-known that for such a
consumer the optimal sequential search strategy is characterized by a price threshold , which is
given by:
 = min fr; vg (11)
If the lowest price quote known is below , the consumer will stop searching and buy from the rm
o¤ering that price quote. Clearly  should be weakly smaller than the willingness to pay v, since he
must obtain a positive utility in order to be willing to buy. The price should also be smaller than the
reservation price r. The latter is such that if it is the lowest price known by a particular consumer,
the expected price decrease from searching for another price, which we denote by 4, would exactly
be o¤set by the search cost s. For any price above (below, resp.) r consumers will thus (not) nd
it worthwhile to continue searching. Hence the consumers reservation price r satises:
4 (r) 
Z r
p
(r   p) f (p) dp = s (12)
where f (p) is the density function of the price distribution F (p).
In equilibrium all rms again randomize according to a nondegenerate price distribution F (p)
with an upper bound now equal to p = . Why rms should not price above v is obvious, but
rms will also not charge a price above r, since this will cause consumers to continue to search
and buy from another rm. Since p = , the lowest price known to each consumer after accessing
the network will be su¢ ciently low such that no consumer nds it worthwhile to engage in costly
search. Consumers thus choose not to become more informed and the information probabilities are
therefore unchanged and given by Theorem 1:
The rms prot function is unchanged compared to the case without sequential search. Using
similar arguments as before we can therefore derive the inverse price distribution, which is now
given by
p (x) = c+
  c
MkP
m=1
m

m
1

xm 1
(13)
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where  is given by equation (11) and x = 1  F (p).
The equilibrium of the sequential search model is now implicitly dened by equation (11),
(12) and (13). Due to the assumption of unit demand we can solve explicitly for the equilibrium
reservation price r. To see this, note that since p = , we have that whenever r < v, equation (12)
can be rewritten as:
r = E [p] + s (14)
where E [p] =
R p
p pf (p) dp. The reservation price equals the expected overall price E [p], which is
what the consumer would pay on average if he would search again, augmented by the search cost s.
The expected price decrease from searching once more, r E [p], is then exactly o¤set by the search
cost s. Using the expression for the inverse price distribution p (x) we can rewrite the expected
price more conveniently as
E [p] =
Z p
p
pdf (p) dp =
Z 1
0
p (x) dx
= c+  (k;N)  (r   c) (15)
where
 (k;N) =
Z 1
0
24MkX
m=1
m

m
1

xm 1
35 1 dx
with  decreasing in k and N , 0    1, and limN!1  = limk!1  = 0.
The overall expected price charged by rms is thus equal to the rms marginal cost plus a
markup which is proportional to the di¤erence in the reservation price and the marginal cost. For
a given r and c this markup is decreasing in the network size k and the number of rms N . The
equilibrium value for the reservation price can now be found by plugging in the expression for E [p]
into equation (14) and solving for r, which yields:
r = c+
s
1   (16)
which is decreasing (increasing, resp.) in k and N (c and s, resp.), and limN!1 r = limk!1 r =
c+ s. The mechanics behind these results are discussed below.
Given our characterization of the equilibrium we now proceed to discuss the main results of
the model with sequential search. We start by comparing the model with sequential search to our
benchmark model without search.
18
Proposition 8 All percentiles of the distribution are weakly lower when consumers have the op-
portunity to search sequentially.
Both in the model with and without search consumers are equally informed, as consumers
choose not to search. When consumers are able to search, rms might however not be able to
charge the same maximum price as before. Firms never charge a price higher than the consumer
valuation v, since otherwise no consumer would ever buy. In the model with search, rms must also
take into account that charging a price above the reservation price r induces consumers to start
searching. Firms refrain from doing so as this would lead them to lose all their customers to rivals.
Whenever the equilibrium reservation price r is below v, the upper bound of the price distribution
is therefore strictly lower when consumers have to opportunity to search. By equation (13) a lower
value for the upper bound  decreases all percentiles of the price distribution.
Next, we consider the comparative statics of an increase in N and k. The comparative statics
of an increase in c and s are not discussed explicitly as they do not change compared to the original
Stahl model. In particular, both increases cause prices to increases unambiguously.
Proposition 9 The reservation price r and all percentiles of F (p) are decreasing in the number
of rms N and the network size k. As the number of rms or the network size grows larger pricing
eventually becomes perfectly competitive.
An increase in the number of rms N or the network size k decreases the equilibrium reservation
price and all percentiles of the distribution. This is because such an increase improves information
transmission among consumers and causes them to become more informed, just like in the model
without search. This in turn induces rms to compete more ercely and decreases prices. Now there
is also be a secondary e¤ect, as consumers reoptimize their reservation price. By equation (14) a
decrease in the expected price of the distribution causes consumers to decrease their reservation
price with the same amount. Whenever r < v such a decrease reduces the upper bound of the
price distribution and further reduces prices. An increase in N or k can therefore have a larger
impact on prices when consumers have the opportunity to search. As the number of rms or the
network grows larger, consumers become fully informed and rms have to compete ercely. For a
given upper bound this again decrease all percentiles of the price distribution. All mass of the price
distribution is concentrated at the marginal cost level c, and the expected price of this degenerate
distribution equals E [p] = c. By equation (14) the reservation price converges to c+ s, and not to
c, as consumers are willing to stop searching at a higher-than-average price due to search frictions.
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Figure 3 demonstrates the e¤ect of an increase in N or k on r by plotting it for various values of
k and N .
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k=3
2 4 6 8 10
N
1
2
r
Figure 3: Equilibrium reservation price (c=0; s=1)
3.2 Network Segregation
In the benchmark model each individual on a consumers network is assumed to have information
on one randomly chosen rm. The information between the di¤erent members of a network and
the consumer using the network is therefore independent. In that case an increase in the number
of rms or the network size increases the likelihood that the consumers on the network have price
information about a di¤erent rm than the one already known by the consumer, thus enhancing
information transmission. The literature on networks with heterogeneous agents has shown however
that agents have a tendency to associate with others similar to themselves (see, e.g., Jackson and
López-Pintado, 2013). In that case the information between the network members is no longer inde-
pendent. A larger network might therefore no longer contribute to the information di¤usal process,
as the extra network members have information that is similar to the members already on the net-
work. We explore the e¤ects of network segregation on information transmission in two di¤erent
ways and show that our main results are robust if networks are not too segregated/integrated. In
that case an increase in N or k continues to improve the information transmission and decreases
all percentiles of the price distribution. We also show that an increase in the degree of network
segregation tends to decrease information transmission and increase all percentiles.
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3.2.1 Segregation I: Information Clustering Around a Subset of Firm Prices
A rst but quite extreme way to include network segregation would be to assume that all network
connections of a particular consumer only know the prices of a random subset of n  N rms, which
is common across the network and includes the rm whose price the consumer already knows. For
example, when n = 2 all connections of a consumer initially knowing the price of rm 1 might only
know the prices of rms 1 and 2, but never know the prices of the other rms. This might be the
case because the consumer and its network connections are geographically concentrated around a
particular set of rms. The value of n relative to N can be thought of as an inverse measure of
network segregation, in the sense that a lower value of n induces information to become clustered
around a smaller set of rms. In the extreme case that n = 1 the network is fully segregated, and
becomes uninformative to the consumer as all connections only know the same rms price.
In this rst setting of segregation all connections now randomly receive price information from
one of the n rms, so we can reinterpret Theorem 1 in terms of n: The consumers probability of
learningm di¤erent prices is now given by m (k; n) instead of m (k;N). Using this reinterpretation
it is easy to see that an increase in the network size k only has an impact on m if the network is
not fully segregated (i.e. n  2). In that case the e¤ect of an increase in k is qualitatively the same
as in the benchmark model: A larger network implies a higher probability of learning a new price,
thus increasing information transmission and decreasing all percentiles of the price distribution.
With fully segregated networks (i.e. n = 1) all connections know the same price as the consumer,
so the latter does not learn any new prices from his network, making the network completely
uninformative. An increase in the actual number of rms N on the other hand will only have an
impact on m to the extent that n changes. As long as n increases in N , networks become more
informative as N increases, and the results of the benchmark model continue to hold: More rms
imply more informative networks inducing more competition and decreasing all percentiles. If on
the other hand n is invariant to N , m will not change and more rms do not increase competition.
It is however more likely that n is increasing in N as the newly entering rm will have to locate
somewhere and as such be close to at least some of the consumers. A last comparative static of
interest is that of a decrease in n. For a given number of rms N , such a decrease can be interpreted
as an increase in the degree of network segregation. By the reinterpretation of Theorem 1 such a
decrease is equivalent to a decrease of N in the benchmark model, thus decreasing information
transmission and increasing all percentiles of the price distribution.
21
3.2.2 Segregation II: Information Clustering Around the Own Price
A second, less extreme, way of including network segregation is to maintain the assumption that
the connections can be informed about all N prices, but to vary the likelihood that any of these
connections knows the same price as the consumer. In particular, denote the probability that a
consumers network connection knows the same price as he does by pI . If the network connection
knows a di¤erent price, which occurs with probability 1  pI , we assume that he is equally likely to
be informed about any of N 1 remaining rmsprices. In the benchmark model all prices known by
the network were completely random, so the probability that any connection knew the same price
as the consumer was 1=N . The benchmark model is therefore the special case in which pI = 1=N ,
and a higher (lower, resp.) value of pI increases (decreases, resp.) the degree of segregation and
makes it less (more, resp.) likely that a new price is learnt through the network. If pI = 0, the
network is fully integrated and all connections will know a di¤erent price than the consumers, so the
consumer will always learn at least one additional price. If on the other hand pI = 1, the network
is fully segregated and all connections know the same price as the consumers, so the consumer will
not learn any new prices.
Generalizing Theorem 1 to allow for the second type of network segregation yields the following
Proposition:
Proposition 10 In a market with N rms and a network segregation level of pI , the fraction
of consumers with a network of size k that is informed about the prices of m rms, denoted byfm (k;N; pI), is given by:
fm (k;N; pI) =
8><>:
kP
l=1
 
k
l

(pI)
k l (1  pI)l m 1 (l   1; N   1) if m Mk
0 if m > Mk
(17)
where m 1 (l   1; N   1) is given by (1) and Mk = min fk + 1; Ng.
Proof. A consumer with a network of size k will only learn additional prices if some of these k
connections are not informed about the same price. The probability that l out of k consumers
know a di¤erent price is given by
 
k
l

(pI)
k l (1  pI)l. Since these l connections know one or
more prices of the remaining N   1 prices, the consumer learns m  1 new prices with probability
m 1 (l   1; N   1). The reason that we write l  1 instead of l is that we have to exclude the price
known by the consumer as we are conditioning on the fact that the connections know a di¤erent
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price than the consumers. To conclude we sum over all possible realizations of l, ranging from 1
to k.
Note that whenever pI = 1=N , the benchmark case is obtained and we have that fm (k;N; 1=N) =
m (k;N). If networks are fully integrated (pI = 0), we have that fm (k;N; 0) = m 1 (k   1; N   1)
where e1 (k;N; 0) = 0. In that cases a consumer would learn new prices as if he had a smaller net-
work (k   1), but whose connections knew only prices he did not already know (N   1). If on the
other hand networks are fully segregated (pI = 1) consumers do not learn any new prices from their
network and we have that e1 (k;N; 1) = 1.
Intuitively we would expect that as long as networks are not fully integrated or segregated,
an increase in the number of rms N or the network size k should have a similar e¤ect on the
information probabilities as in the benchmark model. Moreover, an increase in the degree of network
segregation pI should have a similar e¤ect as a decrease in the network size in the benchmark model.
The reason is that the degree of network segregation can be seen as adding noise to the information
di¤usal process. In a sense, a more segregated network can therefore be seen as a decrease of
the e¤ective network size in the baseline case. This is because in a more segregated network
more connections know the same price as the consumers initial price, making these connections
uninformative. Unfortunately we have not been able to provide a generalization of Corollary 4 for
this second type of network segregation. We do have an expression for the expected number of
prices, which provide evidence for our claim that the result of Corollary 4 should continue to hold
if 0 < pI < 1.
Corollary 11 The expected number of prices observed by a consumer with a network of size k and
network segregation parameter pI is given by:
gEm (k;N; pI) = NP
m=1
mfm (k;N; pI) = N  1  1  1
N

1  1  pI
N   1
k!
(18)
which is concave and increasing in N and k, and convex and decreasing in pI
Proof. see Appendix
Note that whenever pI = 1=N this reduces to Em (k;N). For the two other special cases we have
that when pI = 1 it reduces togEm (k;N; 1) = 1, whereas if pI = 0 we have thatgEm (k;N; 0) = 1+
Em (k   1; N   1). These results are again intuitive since with fully segregated networks consumers
do not learn any additional prices and are thus always informed about a single price. When networks
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are fully integrated consumers always learn additional prices, as if they were sampling k prices from
the N   1 remaining rms.
To conclude we note that the welfare consequences of an increase in k and N also continue to
hold if 0 < pI < 1, as summarized in the Proposition presented below. Moreover, an increase in
the degree of network segregation increases all percentiles.
Proposition 12 When networks are fully integrated or segregated, an increase in N or k does not
a¤ect F (p). If networks are not fully integrated or segregated, an increase in N or k decreases all
percentiles of F (p). An increase in the degree of network segregation pI increases all percentiles of
F (p).
Proof. see Appendix
The intuition behind the e¤ect of an increase in N and k is unchanged compared to the bench-
mark model The reason that an increase in the degree of network segregation pI increases all
percentiles is exactly because it tends to clutter the information transmission. It should therefore
have a similar e¤ect as an decrease in the network size.
3.3 Other Extensions
In this section we briey discuss two other ways in which the model may be further extended:
Product di¤erentiation and network heterogeneity.
So far we have assumed that the product being sold by rms is homogeneous. In that case the
only source of price dispersion is imperfect information. In general rms sell di¤erentiated products,
adding a second dimension of pricing di¤erences. For the case of vertically di¤erentiated products,
the model could easily be extended by using the approach laid down in Wildenbeest (2011). That
approach allows the consumers valuation v to vary across rms, but rms o¤ering a higher quality
face a higher marginal cost c such that the value-to-cost margin vi   ci is constant across rms.
In equilibrium all rms still randomize over prices, but rms o¤ering a higher quality charge a
higher expected price that exactly o¤sets the quality di¤erence. The comparative statics discussed
earlier would then apply to each rms price distribution: An increase in the number of rms or the
network size would decrease all percentiles of each rms price distribution, but price di¤erences
between rms due to quality di¤erences would persist.
In the benchmark model we have also assumed that consumers are homogeneous ex ante, in
the sense that they all have an equally large network size. Ex post, consumers are heterogeneous
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in terms of the number of prices they have learnt through this network, as the network of some
consumers will contain more new prices than others. In reality, consumers are also heterogeneous
in terms of their network size. The model could therefore be adjusted by considering a distribution
of network sizes. As long as consumersnetwork sizes are su¢ ciently similar in size, the benchmark
model should however provide a good approximation and all results should carry over. When there
is extreme heterogeneity things will be di¤erent however. Consider for instance the case when
there are only two types of consumers: A type without a network, who does not compare prices;
and another type with an extremely large network, who always compares all N prices. In such a
conguration of shoppers and non-shoppers it is well-known that an increase in the number
of rms might actually increase prices (see Rosenthal, 1980). Lach and Moraga-González (2012)
however provide a set of general conditions which ensure that all percentiles are decreasing in N ,
which can be checked for each network distribution at hand.
4 Conclusion
This paper introduces consumer information networks as an alternative information mechanism
which is able to capture information spillovers between consumers in a tractable way. It is shown
how larger networks and the entry of new rms increase information transmission, which results
in rms competing more ercely and as a result charge lower prices. These results are robust
to the introduction of costly sequential search as in Stahl (1989). Network segregation tends to
reduce information transmission, but unless networks are fully segregated, a signicant amount of
information can still be transmitted and prices will be decreasing in the network size and the number
of rms. An increase in the degree of network segregation tends to increase prices by clogging the
information transmission.
Future research might focus on the empirical implications of the model. For instance, over the
last decade, an increasing number of papers has been dedicated to uncovering information mech-
anisms using structural methods (e.g. Hong and Shum, 2006; Moraga-González and Wildenbeest,
2008). Uncovering these mechanisms is essential for understanding how markets of imperfect in-
formation work and how policy changes will a¤ect market outcomes. The literature so far has only
focused on estimating search cost, by assuming that consumer information is obtained only by
consumers costly search e¤ort. One direction for future research might therefore to be to focus
on uncovering information networks instead of search costs, and try to estimate how large such
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networks might be. Alternatively, one might consider combining both information channels in a
single empirical model. Galeotti (2010) already pointed out that in reality consumers are likely to
obtain information through their networks as well, and that neglecting this additional channel of
information would lead to a serious bias in search cost estimates. The setup in Galeotti (2010) is
however restricted to a duopoly and thus neglects the fact networks become more informative when
there are more rms. Our model provides a tool to explicitly model information networks in setting
with more than two rms. Future research e¤orts might therefore go into creating an empirical
model in which both consumer search as well as information networks occur simultaneously in a
fully oligopolistic setting.
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5 Appendix
Stirling numbers of the second kind
Table 2: Stirling numbers of the second kind S(a,b)
anb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 7 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 15 25 10 1 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 31 90 65 15 1 0 0 0 0
7 1 63 301 350 140 21 1 0 0 0
8 1 127 966 1701 1050 266 28 1 0 0
9 1 255 3023 7770 6951 2646 462 36 1 0
10 1 511 9330 34105 42525 22827 5880 750 45 1
Proofs
Throughout these proofs we assume that N  2 and k  1.
Proof of Corollary 3
First note that S (k + 1;m) and N !=

Nk+1 (N  m)! are both log concave in m. The product of
two log concave functions is also log concave. Strong unimodality or single-peakedness is implied
by log concavity, and allows for three possible cases: (i) m is (weakly) increasing in m, (ii) m is
rst (weakly) increasing and then (weakly) decreasing in m, (iii) m is (weakly) decreasing in m.
We now show that the beginning of the sequence 1; 2; : : : ; Mk 1; Mk is never decreasing, which
excludes case (iii). From Theorem 1 we have that 2 < 1 if (N   1)
 
2k   1   1 < 0, which is
never satised if N  2 and k  1. We therefore have that m can never be decreasing in m, which
yields case (i) and (ii) of the Corollary.
By unimodality we now only need to check the end of the sequence: If the end is decreasing, we
have case (ii), whereas otherwise we have case (i). We therefore need to verify when Mk 1 > Mk .
There are two situations we need to consider: (a) N  k+ 1 (s.t. Mk = k+ 1), and (b) N < k+ 1
(s.t. Mk = N).
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Starting with (a), we have that k (k;N) > k+1 (k;N) if and only if
N !
Nk+1 (N   k)!S (k + 1; k) >
N !
Nk+1 (N   (k + 1))!S (k + 1; k + 1) , or (19)
S (k + 1; k)
(N   k) > S (k + 1; k + 1)
Since S (k + 1; k + 1) = 1 and S (k + 1; k) =
 
k+1
2

= (k + 1) k=2 this reduces to
(k + 1) k
2
> (N   k) , or (20)
k > k (N)
where
k (N) =
 p
9 + 8N   3
2
, with 1  k (N)  N   1 (21)
which is strictly increasing in N . This inequality is satised if k is su¢ ciently large. For any given
N and k (where N  k + 1) we therefore have that if k (>, resp.)k (N), then m is weakly
increasing in m (rst increasing and then decreasing in m, resp.).
Now consider (b): We have that N 1 (k;N) > N (k;N) if and only if
N !
Nk+1 (N   (N   1))!S (k + 1; N   1) >
N !
Nk+1 (N  N)!S (k + 1; N) , or (22)
S (k + 1; N   1) > S (k + 1; N) , or
G (k + 1; N)  S (k + 1; N   1)
S (k + 1; N)
> 1
The ratio G (k + 1; N) is strictly decreasing in k + 1 and strictly increasing in N .7 Now dene for
each N the largest k that satises the above inequality (if such a k exists) as
k (N) = max fk 2 N : G (k + 1; N) > 1g (23)
such that N 1 > N if N   1 < k  k (N) and N 1  N if k > k (N). If this critical
k (N) exists, then it is unique and (weakly) increasing in N , as G (k + 1; N) is strictly decreasing
(increasing, resp.) in k+1 (N , resp.). We now only need to verify that the interval fN; : : : ; k (N)g
7See Theorem 3.2 in Sibuya (1987) for a proof of this result.
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is non-empty. To do this we consider the smallest value of k in this interval, i.e. k = N , and check
whether N  k (N). If this holds, then there is at least one k in the interval so it is non-empty.
Plugging in k = N , we obtain
G (N + 1; N) =
S (N + 1; N   1)
S (N + 1; N)
(24)
If we now use that8
S (N + 1; N) =

N + 1
2

=
(N + 1)N
2
(25)
S (N + 1; N   1) = 1
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(N + 1)N (N   1) (1 + 3 (N   1))
we can rewrite G (N + 1; N) as
G (N + 1; N) =
1
12
(N   1) (3N   2) (26)
which is strictly increasing in N if N  2. If we nd that G (N + 1; N) > 1 for a particular value
of N , we have that N  k (N) for that particular value of N , but also for all N exceeding that
value. If N = 2 then G (3; 2) = 1=3 < 1, so the interval is empty. In that case we never have
that 1 > 2. If N = 3 then G (4; 3) = 7=6 > 1, and the interval is non-empty. For all N  3 we
therefore have that if N < k+1 and k >(, resp.)k (N), then m is weakly increasing in m (rst
increasing and then decreasing in m, resp.).
Combining the results from (a) and (b) we have that: If N = 2, then 1  2. If N  3, then m
is increasing in m if k  k (N) or k  k (N), and rst increasing and then decreasing in m if
k (N) < k < k (N).
Proof of Corollary 4
From Theorem 1, we have that m (k;N + 1)  m (k;N)  0 if and only if
(N + 1)!
(N + 1)k+1 (N + 1 m)! 
N !
Nk+1 (N  m)! (27)
8See Abramowitz and Stegun (1972).
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Solving for m yields
m  mN (k;N) = (N + 1)
 
1 

N
N + 1
k!
; where 1 < mN (k) < N + 1 (28)
This critical mN (k;N) is concave and increasing in both k and N .
From Theorem 1, we also have that m (k + 1; N)  m (k;N) if and only if
1
Nk+1
S (k + 2;m)  1
Nk
S (k + 1;m) ; or (29)
1
N
 R (k + 1;m)  S (k + 1;m)
S (k + 2;m)
Now note that the LHS of the inequality is positive, weakly smaller than 1=2, and independent of
m. The RHS is strictly decreasing in m.9 It also holds that R (k + 1; 1) = 1 and R (k + 1; k + 2) =
0. Consequently there exists a unique 1  mk (k;N)  k + 2 such that 1N  R (k + 1;m) if
m  mk (k;N). As the RHS is independent of N and the LHS is decreasing in N , we have that
mk (k;N) is (weakly) increasing in N . Since the LHS is independent of k, and the RHS is increasing
in k we also have that mk (k;N) is increasing in k.
9
Proof of Proposition 6
Restating equation (9), we have that
p (x) = c+
v   c
MkP
m=1
m

m
1

xm 1
A su¢ cient condition for all percentiles to be increasing is if (m=1) is strictly increasing. We now
show that this su¢ cient condition is indeed satised. From Theorem 1, we have that
m
1
=
(N   1)!
(N  m)!S (k + 1;m)  1 (30)
Showing that this fraction is increasing in N is now straightforward. The result that the fraction
is increasing in k follows from the fact that S (k + 1;m) is increasing in k + 1.10
9See Theorem 3.2 and 3.3 in Sibuya (1987) for a proof of these results.
10This follows immedeatly from the fact that Stirling numbers of the second kind satisfy the recurrence relation
S (k + 1;m) = mS (k;m) + S (k;m  1).
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Proof of Corollary 11
Even though the probability distribution function of the number of di¤erent prices is fairly com-
plicated (cf. Theorem 1), the expected value of this distribution,
Em (k;N; pI) =
PN
m=1m  m (k;N; pI) , (31)
can be found rather easily by expressing it as a sum of indicator variables and exploiting the linearity
of the expectation operator. To see this, dene Ii as the indicator variable which takes on the value
1 if rm is price is known by a consumer (after consulting the network), and 0 otherwise. The
number of di¤erent prices known by the consumer is then given by the sum
PN
i=1 Ii. By linearity
of the expectation operator we have that
Em (k;N; pI) = E
hPN
i=1 Ii
i
=
PN
i=1E [Ii] = NE [Ii] (32)
where the last equality follows from the fact that rms are symmetric. The expected value of E [Ii]
is the probability that rm is price is drawn, and is the inverse of the probability that rm is
price is not drawn. The probability that is price is not drawn is the probability that rm i is not
the consumers initial sample, which happens with probability 1  (1=N), and the probability that
none of the k network connections contains rm is price. If l out of k network connections are in a
di¤erent group (so they do not know the same price as the consumers initial price), which occurs
with probability
 
k
l

(pI)
k l (1  pI)l, the conditional probability that price i is not known by the
l connections is (1  1= (N   1))l. The probability that none of the k connections knows price i is
then given by the following sum:
Pk
l=1

k
l

(pI)
k l (1  pI)l

1  1
N   1
l
=

1  1  pI
N   1
k
(33)
where the equality follows from the Binomial theorem. The probability that rm is price is known
is thus given by
E [Ii] = 1 

1  1
N

1  1  pI
N   1
k
(34)
The overall expectation is thus given by
Em (k;N; pI) = N
 
1 

1  1
N

1  1  pI
N   1
k!
(35)
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When pI = 1=N this reduces to
Em (k;N; 1=N) = N
 
1 

1  1
N
k+1!
(36)
Proof of Corollary 12
Since e1 (k;N; pI) = (pI)k, we have that
fme1 =
kP
l=1

k
l

1  pI
pI
l
m 1 (l   1; N   1) (37)
We now rewrite pI as a function of the benchmark value 1=N . More in particular, let
pI (a) =
1
(1  a) + aN , where a 2 [0;1) (38)
which is strictly decreasing in a and where pI (0) = 1, pI (1) = 1=N and lima!1 pI (a) = 0. The
ratio (1  pI) =pI is then given by a (N   1), so we can rewrite equation (37) as
fme1 =
kP
l=1

k
l

al (N   1)l m 1 (l   1; N   1) (39)
=
kP
l=1

k
l

al (N   1)l (N   1)!
(N   1)l (N  m)!S (l;m  1)
=
kP
l=1

k
l

al
(N   1)!
(N  m)!S (l;m  1)
where the second equality follows from Theorem 1. When pI ! 0 we have that fm= e1 ! 1 for
m  2, whereas if pI = 1 we have that fm= e1 = 0 for m  2. In both cases the ratio is independent
of N or k. Whenever 0 < pI < 1 the ratio is again increasing in N and k. This is because each
of the components of the sum are increasing. Similarly, the ratio is decreasing in pI as each of the
components of the sum is increasing in a.
Note that when pI = 1=N we have that a = 1 and ratio reduces to
fm (pI = 1=N)e1 (pI = 1=N) = (N   1)!(N  m)!
kP
l=1

k
l

S (l;m  1) (40)
=
(N   1)!
(N  m)!
kP
l=m 1

k
l

S (l;m  1)
=
(N   1)!
(N  m)!S (k + 1;m)
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where the second equality follow the fact that S (a; b) = 0 if a < b, and the third equality follows
from a well-known recurrence relation that the Stirling numbers satisfy.
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